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In this article, we argue the rate of profit in combination with the movement of the real 
net profits determines the phase-change of the economy in its long cyclical pattern. 
Since WWII, the US and the world economy have experienced two such long cycles. 
The pandemic COVID-19 has deepened a recession that has been already underway 
since 2007. The growth rates in the first post-pandemic years are expected to be high; 
however, soon after, the economies will find themselves back to their old recessionary 
growth paths. The onset of a new long cycle requires the restoration of profitability, 
which can be sustained only through the introduction of ‘disruptive’ innovations backed 
by suitable institutional arrangements 
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There is enough evidence that the US and the World economies are from 2007 onwards 
in a lasting recessionary state. Such a situation has also received the approval of 
prominent economists, who have resurrected the almost forgotten Alvin Hansen's 
secular stagnation (SS) thesis (Summers 2014, Krugman 2014, R.J. Gordon 2016, 
among a host of others). Unlike the SS thesis, in our discussion of the US and by extent 
the World economy, we explain the slowdown in economic activity through the falling 
rate of profit, which in the long run leads to the stagnating mass of real net profits and, 
in so doing, discourages net investment and increases unemployment. Furthermore, we 
argue that there is neither perpetual prosperity nor permanent stagnation; underneath 
the currently stagnation phenomena, there are forces at work acting in restoring 
profitability, which coupled with suitable new institutional arrangements, may create a 
new economic environment paving the way for the onset of a new long cycle. 
 
Since the industrial revolution of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the above 
long cycles scenario has been repeated five times; however, it is questionable whether 
the same dynamics are already at work and are strong enough to give rise to a sixth 
repeat.1 Meanwhile, the pandemic of 2020-2021 deepened a prolonged recession 
already underway and, at the same time, accelerated the rate of introduction of new 
innovations impacting employment in ways altogether different from those in the past, 
compelling the creation of new institutions to corroborate these changes. The question 
is to what extent, if any, these innovations motivated by the pandemic have the 
dynamics of the old ones and they will restore and sustain profitability at high levels 
and by doing so provide the fuel for the upturn of a sixth long cycle.  
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the long 
cycles and the associated phenomena. Section 3 explains the currently downward phase 
as a result of the movement in profitability. Section 4 brings relevant statistical evidence 
based on the estimation of two logistic curves using quarterly data on the US corporate 
real net profits spanning the period 1946:1 - 2020:4. Section 5 discusses the effects of 
the pandemic and its impact on the cyclical movement of the economy. Section 6 
summarizes and makes some concluding remarks about future research efforts. 
 
 
2. Long cycles and the current state of the US economy 
The idea of the long cyclical movement of the economy is old and can be found mainly 
in the works of Kondratiev (1935, 1998). Schumpeter (1942) and the approach based 
on the social structures of accumulation (Gordon et al. 1987) point to different 
explanations of the long cycles. The Schumpeterian interpretation is couched on the 
                                                          
1 The periodization of long cycles is as follows: First long cycle: 1790s to 1840s (up: 1790–1815; down: 
1815–1845). Second long cycle: 1840s to 1890s (up: 1845–1873; down: 1873–1896). Third long cycle: 
1890s to 1940s (up: 1896–1920s; down: 1920s–1940). Fourth long cycle: 1940s to 1980s (up: 1940–
1965; down: 1966–1982). Fifth long cycle: 1980s to the present (up: 1982–2007; down: 2007–present) 
(Tsoulfidis and Papageorgiou 2019). 
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‘swarms of innovations’, which lead to the rising stage of the long cycle while the 
completion of their diffusion brings the economy to its stagnating phase. The 
proponents of the social structure of accumulation argue that the introduction of suitable 
institutional framework is what propels long term growth but, past a critical point, the 
same institutions become a burden that slows down the growth rate of the economy 
necessitating a new set of growth promoting institutions.  
 
In this article, we argue that the innovations and the required institutional setup, along 
with a host of other phenomena (volume of international trade, sovereign defaults, 
social unrests, and international conflicts, among others) are the results of the evolution 
of the profit rate, an explanation more consistent with Kondratiev, as this can be derived 
from his response to his criticizers (Kondratiev 1998). Kondratiev, although not a 
Marxist, was more in determining endogenously the movement of long cycles through 
the interest (profit) rate. He opposed to the idea of exogenously determined shocks such 
as innovations, wars, new markets and sources of raw materials and the like, whose 
likelihood of occurrence or discovery is derived from the inner dynamics of the system. 
In the same spirit, even the Covid-19 pandemic would not be considered an external 
but rather an internally generated shock caused by environmental and economic 
changes driven by the restructuring of agriculture, urbanization, globalization, and 
neoliberal economic policies favoring unregulated markets. 
 
Naturally, this explanation is consistent with Marx's view of the law of the tendentially 
falling rate of profit, albeit he did not live to experience not even the end of the second 
long cycle. If the rate of profit is in its long-run downward direction, the probability of 
default, on average, is higher, much higher, than the risk of innovation. The long-lasting 
downturns in economic activity and the associated with it falling rate of profit constitute 
the ideal environment for the flourishing of groundbreaking innovations (such as those 
of steam engine, railroads, electricity, etc.) and the introduction of epoch-making 
institutional changes (such as those during the New Deal in the 1930s and the 
dismantling of various institutions of the so-called welfare state replacing them by 
others, during neoliberalism in the 1980s).  
 
The current recessionary phase of the long cycle bears many similarities with those of 
the past, but we must note that each particular phase possesses its own unique features. 
For example, the 1946-1965 rising phase of the fourth long cycle has been characterized 
as the ‘golden age of accumulation’ because of the high growth rates while in the 
following recessionary period until 1982, the unemployment rates were moderate and 
the inflation rate was unusually high for a recessionary phase of a long cycle. The 1983-
2007 rising phase of the fifth long cycle has been characterized as the 'great moderation' 
because of its low inflation rates, low interest rates, and shallow business cycles. The 
same does not hold for the recessionary post-2007 phase which is inflicted by rising 
income inequalities and polarization, some bubbles, and two severe downturns in the 
years 2009 and 2020. The downturn caused by the pandemic is the worst in the post-
WWII period and is estimated for the USA at -3.5%; to get an idea of the size of the 
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downturn in 2020 it is worth mentioning that the downturn in 1982 was only at -1.82% 
while that in 2009 was -2.9%. In the South European countries, the growth rate in 2020 
is estimated at -9.3% while the EU's average is about -6.1%; in China, the growth rate 
in 2020 is positive at 2.3%, which is about three times lower than its average of the 
recent decade(s) (see also Figure 1 below).  
 
There is no doubt that the pandemic Covid-19 will leave its indelible mark on the 
economic history of this century, as this can be ascertained by comparing its growth 
reduction effects with those of 1918 influenza, during which the USA growth rate from 
8.6% dropped to 0.8% in 1919. Nevertheless, such a slowdown cannot be compared to 
the drop in 1922 estimated at -2.3%, let alone the year 1932 when the growth rate of 
real GDP dropped -13.8%.3 Hence, it is important to emphasize that the 1918-1919 
influenza inflicted the USA and the World was in the upturn of their long cycle while 
the magnitude of its impact on the growth rate confirms a stylized fact of the long 
cycles. That is, when the economies are in their upturn, the frequency of recessions is 
lower and their depth shallower; the exact opposite is observed in the downturn of the 
long cycle, as we are experiencing with the current pandemic.   
 
Figure 1 below displays the growth rates of the real GDP of the USA, China, and the 
World economy. The data come from the IMF’s publication (www.imf.org/external/ 
datamapper) spanning the period of the fifth long cycle and give rise to a visual 
understanding of the evolution in economic growth and the Covid-19 effect. We 
observe that the rising phase of the fifth long cycle (1983-2007) was marked by shallow 
business cycles. The same does not hold for the post-2007 phase, which was punctuated 
by two severe downturns, namely the 2008-2009 and the one induced by the pandemic 
in 2020-2021. 
 
                                                          
3 The real GDP data estimates of growth rates for the years 1918 and 1919 are from the Economic History 
database https://eh.net/databases while the more recent ones are reported in the IMF’s database 




Figure 1: Growth rates USA, China and World Economy, 1980-2026 
 
In the same Figure 1, we also observe that from 2021 onwards, the projection by the 
IMF is that pretty much the economies will return to the low stagnating growth rates of 
the post-2007 period. It is interesting to note that the IMF’s time-series data, 
coincidentally perhaps, spans the period of a nearly long cycle, which, as we argue 
below, is expected to be completed around the same year.  
 
The post-2007 period anemic growth rates and the two severe downturns have 
resurrected the old notion of SS whose current version emphasizes the gradual but 
substantial shift from a younger to an older population age structure, whose high saving 
propensity is responsible for the low investment. Other variants of SS thesis single out 
the rising income inequalities (Krugman 2014) and the diminishing returns to new 
innovations (R.J. Gordon 2015).5  
 
 
3. Rate of profit, real net profits and stagnating investment 
The main argument of the article is that long cycles are induced by the long-run 
movement in the profit rate and the mass of real net profits. All start with the nature of 
capital which is oriented in the extraction of maximum possible profit and in 
competition with labor and other capitals. This two-front competition leads to the 
mechanization and the automation of the production process and to a rising capital-
output ratio or, what is the same, a falling maximum rate of profit. The latter compresses 
the economy-wide rate profit to an even sharper fall, as we know from the pertinent 
                                                          
5 R.J. Gordon’s explanation echoes a similar but broader view according to which all major scientific 
discoveries have been already made, and from now on only minor improvements of the old ones are left 


















literature (Shaikh 1992, 2016; Tsoulfidis and Tsaliki 2019). Starting with the profit rate 
defined as 
 𝑟 = 𝛱𝛫 = ProfitsInvested Capital 
 
and by taking growth rates, we get 
 
 ?̂? = ?̂?⏟± + ?̂?⏟+  
 
As long as the right-hand side of the above equation is positive, the mass of net real 
profits is growing, and the economy is in its upward stage. If the rate of profit is in its 
downward direction, and the rate of its fall is less than that of the growth rate of capital, 
the mass of real net profits will be still rising. Under these conditions, the economy 
expands at a healthy growth rate, as output, demand, employment are all on their rise, 
and an aura of optimism permeates society. For example, in the 1990s during the upturn 
of the long cycle, opinion makers and economists used to assert that the modern 
economy is not affected any more by severe recessions, as in the past. The cliché was 
that our ‘new economy’ is qualitatively different from those in the past, because of the 
rapid spread of information and its efficient utilization by firms which, on average, 
make the right decisions, thereby rendering the economy depressions proof. This view 
was almost “forgotten” in the mid-2000s with the burst of the real estate and stock 
market bubbles. Quite similar was the optimism that prevailed in the 1960s when, once 
again, the economy was thought to be depressions-proof because of the prevailed 
‘mixed economy’ in which state intervention through the appropriate mix of fiscal and 
monetary policies could maintain the economy in its stable and healthy growth path. 
But during the stagflation crisis in the 1970s, these views ceased to be popular. 
 
As the economy is in its upward phase, the rising investment and the built-up of capital 
stock lead to a rising capital-output ratio, which eventually gives rise to a falling rate 
of profit followed by a positive albeit falling growth rate. The positive but falling 
growth rate and the negative growth of the profit rate reach to a critical point 
neutralizing each other out, leading to the stagnating mass of real net profits. As a 
consequence, past this tipping point of real net profits, investment is withheld and 
together with the rising unemployment mark the onset of the crisis. But why is 
investment withheld? The answer relates to the stagnating real net profits; with no 
incremental profits, why would businesses (on average) invest? The slowdown in 
investment induces financial institutions to grant new loans to recover the old ones. 
However, new loans require the expansion of economic activity, which may become 
possible through lower real interest rates and the tempering of lending standards. 
Meanwhile, firms in the face of falling interest rates and profitability, would rather buy 
back shares, distribute dividends or invest in titles and not invest in real capital. As a 
consequence, bubbles are being created and at the same time, the long-lasting 
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recessionary situation creates a suitable environment to foster new innovations. The 
idea is that falling profitability, in the long run, reaches the critical point where the risk 
of default outweighs the risk of innovation. The so-called ‘disruptive innovations’, as 
it has been repeatedly argued, are introduced towards the end of the recessionary phase 
of the long cycle (Tsoulfidis and Papageorgiou 2019 and the literature cited there). 
Figure 2 below summarizes the chain of events over the full period of a long cycle. 
 
 
Figure 2: The cyclical movement of key variables 
 
Figure 3 below confirms the tight relationship between the growth rate of the economy 
and the rate of profit in the data of the US economy for the postwar period. The details 
of this close relationship between the two variables we explore in the Appendix through 
the use of an ARDL econometric model. 
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Figure 3: Rate of profit and growth rate, USA 1950-2020 (www.ggdc.net/pwt)6 
 
The gap or the ratio between the two variables (growth rate and rate of profit) has 
received various, in our view complementary, interpretations. The gap may be used as 
an explanation of the upturn or downturn phases of long cycles (Shaikh 1992; Tsoulfidis 
and Tsaliki 2019) as well as an indicator of the inflationary pressures (Shaikh 2016), 
the rising inequalities in income and wealth distribution (Piketty 2015) and the growth 
of unproductive expenditures in the economy (Tsoulfidis et al. 2019).  
 
In short, the burst of the bubbles and the new innovations separate and combined with 
the rising unemployment and falling wages over long periods make possible the 
recovery of profitability and form the conditions for the onset of a new long cycle. The 
innovative investment and the associated ‘creative destruction’ of the capital stock 
eventually set the stage for the upswing phase of a new long cycle. The inevitable 
devaluation of capital and the subsequent concentration and centralization of capital 
along with falling wages restore the economy-wide profit rate and profitability in 
general. The question is whether this restoration of profitability is going to last to 
sustain a full long cycle. The answer to this question has to do with the character of the 
new innovations and the extent to which their destructive effects are “creative” enough 
to devaluate sufficiently the old capital stock compelling the creation of new institutions 
to corroborate the changes, which would have taken place anyway. Thus, both the 
Schumpeterian (1942) ‘gale of innovations’ and the epoch-making institutions of the 
‘social structures of accumulation’ approach to long cycles (Gordon et al. 1987; Kotz 
and Basu 2019) are both derived from the evolution of the profit rate. In short, they are 
the outcomes of the movements in the rate of profit and not the cause of the long cycle.  
 
 
                                                          
6 The time-series data from Penn (Feenstra et al. 2015) span the period 1950-2019 (www.ggdc.net/pwt). 
The growth rate for the year 2020 we got it from the IMF database (www.imf.org). The rate of profit for 






















4. Real Profits and Long Cycles  
The relation between the rate of profit and the growth rate of the US economy is visually 
confirmed in Figure 3 while, for the shake of space and simplicity, in the Appendix we 
present the empirical analysis which quantifies this relationship using current 
econometric techniques. All the results of the empirical analysis provide strong 
statistical support of the classical political economy hypothesis and argument for the 
centrality of the rate of profit in determining the economy's growth rate. Having 
established the connection between the economy's growth rate to the economy-wide 
average rate of profit, we now look at the hypothesis that the mass of real net profits of 
the postwar US economy may follow an S-shaped or logistic pattern. To confirm this 
we use quarterly data on corporate real profits after taxes, capital consumption 
allowances and inventory valuation adjustments of the total economy.7 The quarterly 
data, spanning the period from 1947:1 until 1982:4 cover the fourth long cycle while 
the data from 1983:1 to 2020:4 cover the fifth long cycle. We are testing the following 
form of the logistic regression:  
 𝛱(𝑡) = 𝐴 + 𝐾 − 𝐴1 +  𝑒−(𝑎𝑡+𝑏) 
 
where 𝛱(𝑡) stands for the dependent variable, that is corporate profits, 𝑡 is the time 
variable, 𝐴 is the lower asymptote of the non-linear regression, 𝐾 is the upper asymptote 
of the logistic curve, 𝑎 is the growth rate and 𝑏 is the parameter indicating the precise 
location of the curve. 
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The estimated parameters of the two logistic curves are all economically meaningful, 
as this can be judged by their sign and also magnitude and they are statistically 
significant (the t-ratios in parentheses). In other words, all of the above features of our 
estimations paint very accurate descriptions of a well-behaved S-shaped pattern in the 
movement of real net profits of the US economy. The 𝑅-square is pretty high given the 
statistically strict requirements of the 𝑆– shaped curves.  
 
                                                          
7The quarterly data of corporate profits are from the Fred (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/) and were accessed 
on April 21, 2021. These data are deflated by the gross private domestic fixed nonresidential investment 
deflator index (2012=100) also available from the same source.  
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In Figure 4, we show the estimated logistic (fitted) curve together with the actual curve 
formed by the quarterly data of real corporate profits of the USA spanning the period 
1947:1 until 1982:4 shown in the upper panel, along with the curves corresponding to 
the first and second derivatives of the fitted function shown in the lower panel. The 
inflection point is derived visually (lower panel) through the time rate of change of the 
logistic curve (or estimated trend). Mathematically speaking, the first derivative of the 
function, describing the dynamics of the logistic curve, display the upper and lower 
asymptotes as well as the maximum point while with the second derivative we 
determine the turning point of the logistic curve which occurs in the middle of its S-




Figure 4: Mass of real net corporate profits, USA, 1947:1 - 1982:4 
 
The mathematical analysis, but also the visual inspection of Figure 4, shows that the 
inflection point occurs at 𝑡𝑚 = − 3.3840.050 = 66.814 = 16.7 years which added to 1947, we 
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is equal to zero while the second derivative from positive becomes negative. By taking 
the average of the two asymptotes (K and A), we get the profits corresponding to the 
year 1962:3 which is 
𝐾+𝐴2 = 147.52  billion USD in constant 2012 prices. At the point 
that the second derivative is zero, the first derivative is maximized while the logistic 
curve attains its inflection point. From Figure 5, we observe that the US economy 
already from early 1960s enters into the downturn of the fourth long-cycle which lasted 
up until the early to mid-1980s. Judging from the shapes of the moves of the first and 
second derivatives, we can say that the cycle was completed already in 1982:4. More 
specifically, the bell shape curve of the first derivative (Figure 5, lower panel) indicates 
that the logistic growth has completed its full trajectory signifying the end of the fourth 
cycle and the beginning of the fifth on which turns now our attention. 
 
The quarterly data of corporate real net profits spanning the period 1983:1-2020:4 cover 
the fifth long cycle which is underway towards its end. As a consequence, the non-
linear regression results for the fifth long cycle, presented in the lower part of Table 1, 
are not definitive as those of the fourth long cycle. Figure 5 displays a logistic fit of the 
quarterly time-series data of real net corporate profits for the period 1983:1-2020:4. In 
similar to the fourth long cycle fashion, we portray the same figure in the two panels.  
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From the panel of graphs in Figure 5, we observe the fifth long cycle is still underway 
towards its completion; the approximate estimation of its inflection point gives us a 
clue of the years remaining to the saturation point. More specifically, judging by the 
lower panel, we expect the stagnation in profits to continue towards the end of the 
decade. Notwithstanding, the estimated parameters do not show the exact year of the 
inflection point. However, judging from the lower panel of Figure 6, we find that the 
first derivative is maximized in the year 2006:1; that is, in approximately 23 years since 
1982 while the attainment of the saturation point will require as many years. The first 
time derivative of real net profits in the lower panel is not bell-shaped, indicating the 
cycle is not yet fully completed. The second derivative of real net profits attains its 
critical point (equal to zero) in the year 2006:1, and the negative part of the curve shows 
there is still time to approximate the zero bound. Our findings based on logistic curves 




5. Economic Consequences of the Pandemic 
The pandemic Covid-19 will be remembered not only for the worst postwar fall in 
economic activity but also for leveling to the surface pre-existing economic problems 
and social issues. As is well-known, in the ideology and practice of neoliberalism, the 
welfare state is thought to be a burden, and its dismantling a precondition for vigorous 
economic growth. More specifically, the depressionary state of the economy since 2007 
and its worsening due to the pandemic revealed weaknesses, such as the inadequacy of 
social safety nets, lack of trust in institutions, racial, regional, ethnic, and other social 
conflicts. The neoliberal ideas and economic policies in the face of the pandemic were 
quickly abandoned, and ironically, even the otherwise neoliberal parties and 
governments suggested or even implemented expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies. The motto “we are all Keynesians now” not only returned but got even lauder, 
and the rising deficits and debts are considered more like a virtue rather than a vice. 
The low-interest rates guarantee the servicing of the rising debts, and the expectation is 
that as soon as the economies find themselves back on their vigorous growth path, the 
public debt will cease to be a problem.  
 
From the political economy perspective, the pandemic became a catalyst and, at the 
same time, an accelerator of changes in the workplace and social relations in general; 
it has contributed to the spread of innovations that otherwise would have taken much 
longer. The innovations that spread quite rapidly like Zoom, Blackboard collaborate, 
Microsoft teams, frivolous as they appear at first sight, they meant to stay and spread 
inducing marked changes in the labor process, the place and manner in which 
transactions take place, how communications are contacted, and the like. Education has 
been also affected and the distant learning alternative will certainly remain and, by 
expanding its applications, will increase its popularity in the near future. The 
entertainment industry and virtually all aspects of social relations and contacts have 
already been affected and we are just in the beginning. It is important to reiterate that 
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these particular innovations are mainly related to telecommunications and have the 
following major effects that make them attractive from businesses: 
 
- Reduce production costs through the devaluation of capital (fewer building 
facilities and less space requirements generally reduce operating costs). 
- Wages are practically reduced, as the working time at home and intensity of 
work increases and the lack of comprehensive laws and related institutions may 
lead to overt workers exploitation. 
- Workers may concede to wage reductions as they no longer have workplace-
related expenses. 
 
The "choice" of telecommunication-related innovations, when applicable, is forced 
upon businesses due to cost reduction and so, not only will stay, but further develop 
and spread accelerating the digital metamorphosis of society. The application of 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, robotics, and industrial automatization find 
wide applications and they are supposed to be the innovations that will lead us to what 
many consider as the popular nowadays ‘fourth industrial revolution’.9 However, these 
innovations appear as more destroying rather than creating new stable and well paid 
jobs. As a consequence, income inequalities are expected to increase, either because 
these innovations will place many businesses out of the market increasing 
unemployment or simply because these innovations do not create more jobs than those 
they destroy. This is particularly true in low-skills employment which can be more 
easily replaced by automation. Naturally, unemployment will be on the rise, especially 
in the low skills workers, worsening inequalities in income distribution, the main cause, 
according to the proponents of the SS thesis, of the lasting stagnating economy. The 
income distribution data of the US and, in general, of major economies show rising 
income disparities especially after 2007.10 
 
In the face of these prospects, there are concerns and discussions about 
counterbalancing the negative to employment consequences of the specific innovations 
through the introduction of the universal basic income, UBI, a controversial measure 
variants of which has been supported, at times, by both conservative and radical 
economists. Those against the UBI argue that this might be the policy measure through 
which we are going to have the dissolution of the welfare state as we know it.  
Furthermore, the UBI is expected to bring a confrontation between the insiders (those 
in good paying jobs) and the outsiders. Consequently, polarization of society (dual-
class societies) is heightened and essentially set the laboring class under the control of 
big businesses. Nevertheless, the UBI appears to be effective in the case of extreme 
poverty but it may lead to widening inequalities between social classes.  
 
                                                          
9 Proponents of the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ in their periodization find an industrial revolution 
approximately every century starting from the eighteenth century towards the present (Schwab 2017).  
10 The studies by Piketty (2014) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) point to the same direction. 
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Unlike though the SS thesis, these same phenomena are precisely those expected from 
the falling profitability, which past a point, leads to rising default rates, increased 
concentration and centralization of capital and, inevitably, rising unemployment rates, 
provided that they are appropriately measured (Komlos 2021). The idea is that not all 
firms can cope with the new requirements. The least competitive firms will either be 
priced out of the markets (by their more efficient competitors employing capital using 
and labor-saving technologies) or become the vulnerable targets for takeovers, which 
are currently on the rise. Of course, there are firms, in the non-contact intensive 
industries, like pharmaceuticals, couriers, and those on the internet, which go through 
a very lucrative period. These industries are favored by teleworking and thrived under 
pandemic conditions. In sharp contrast, the contact-intensive industries (i.e., airlines, 
tourism, arts, and entertainment but also private universities, and many manufacturing 
firms) have suffered an unprecedented blow that will place many of them out of the 
market, unless there is generous government aid. Finally, firms in retailing industry, by  
reorganizing and utilizing online platforms, struggle to respond to the ever-changing 
challenges in markets in this new emerging era.  
 
Naturally, there is reorganization everywhere, and soon we will find ourselves in a 
transformed society and economy, which if left to their own devices, they will give rise 
to the following: 
 
- Widening of inequalities at both national and regional level  
- Spread of capital-using labor-saving technologies  
- Increased unemployment and underemployment 
- Impoverishment of large sections of the population 
 
As a consequence of these changes, we are witnessing a rapid increase in both private 
(household and business) and public debt. Rising public debt is of great concern not 
only for the “usual suspects” (Argentina, Greece, Japan, among many others) but 
because the list has expanded to include many “above suspicion” countries, such as the 
USA whose debt is currently around 130%, well above the thresholds of 60% of the 
EMU, 77% of the World Bank, and 90% suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
 
The projections in the years to come are, in general, optimistic, and they are based on 
the spread of innovations, which will be accelerated by government intervention. This 
scenario depends on the effectiveness of vaccination programs and the effective 
utilization of emergency measures taken by the US government and the developments 
in the EUs Recovery and Resilience Fund and other countries. In addition,  
 
- There is a discussion for a possible “hair cut” of debt obligations, especially 
those created during the pandemic, and there are also discussions about various 
public debt settlements. 
- It is now more and more recognized that there can be no national solution and 
the de facto international cooperation will be sought from a perspective of 
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smoothing out inequalities and daring debt solutions (be it a "hair-cut" or other 
settlements). 
 
Certainly, the pandemic revealed the limits of the market in general and the private 
sector in particular to meet the demands of major challenges. However, as we argued, 
neither the US nor any other from the major economies displayed vigorous growth rates 
before the pandemic, and nothing so far suggests that the long-term global recession is 
over. The US and with that the international economy is expected soon to recover to 
their pre-pandemic anemic growth rates. The current innovations (in our view, the last 
of the Internet era), although they cause many changes in society; nevertheless, do not 
promise anything altogether different. However, they have the potential to act as 
catalysts for the emergence of new so-called ‘disruptive innovations’ that will give rise 
to an era, like the internet in the 1980s, the electricity and railroads in the nineteenth 
century, and steam-engine in the industrial revolution. Such a prospect can only emerge 
through public funding of basic research and international cooperation; only then there 
will be the foundations and necessary conditions for a rising phase of a sixth long cycle. 
Conditions that are hard to be fulfilled at the present or near future times. 
 
 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The economy since 2007 is in the downturn phase of the fifth long cycle. Our projection 
based on real corporate net profits of the US economy is that the stagnation will 
continue after the pandemic, despite the expected rising profitability, which cannot last 
for long unless major disruptive innovations signify the onset of the sixth long cycle. 
Hence, the post-COVID-19 economy may not be all that different from its previous 
settings. The employment prospects in the post-pandemic period are not good enough. 
The reason is that the new technologies, namely, Artificial Intelligence, Machine 
Learning, Robotics, and Industrial Automation, admittedly eliminate more jobs than 
those they create, at least, in the short run. These new technologies increase productivity 
and reduce costs and, therefore, increase profits, but cause unemployment. Under these 
circumstances and with these new technologies, if the economy is left to its own 
devices, the future of work will be gloomy. This is the reason why governments must 
intervene at both national and international levels (in cooperation with international 
organizations) to create the institutional panoply to secure employment and someway 
guarantee enough income for dissent leaving. The current emergency financial 
assistance programs can be thought of as a first-rate testing procedure for the future 
application of the much-discussed controversial UBI. 
 
During the current pandemic, it is generally acknowledged, that the private sector and 
the market, both so much praised during the decades of neoliberalism, have been more 
part of the problem rather than its solution. By contrast, the suppressed public sector 
surprisingly enough contributed a great deal to provide answers to the urgent economic 
and social problems. For example, progress in vaccination and medication was the 
result of public funding and cooperation among international institutions, universities, 
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and research centers across the globe. These developments show that more attention 
should be directed to the role of the public and international cooperation on many 
interrelated issues. Finally, the pandemic has shown that the public sector is crucial in 
tackling critical issues, starting from public health, moving to the environment, 
strengthening basic research, and confronting other vital issues, like national and 
regional disparities.    
 
From our discussion it follows that the material conditions after the pandemic are the 
same as before and the economies soon will return to their previous anemic growth 
rates. The moderate increase in the rate of profit and the real net profits are not enough 
to encourage net investment and initiate the onset of new long cycle. Government’s 
expansionary policies certainly ameliorate the negative effects of the pandemic, and at 
the same time may provide directions to firms and financial institutions towards 
designating investment activities. Having the experience of Covid-19 being the result 
of increasing commodification and environmental destruction, governments and 
international organizations should be particularly careful with the kind of activities they 
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Appendix: The econometrics of the profit - growth rates relationship 
Having established the theoretical relationship between profit and growth rates, the next 
step is to quantify their relationship using popular and, at the same time, efficient 
econometric technique. To this end we specify the following VAR model with the rate 
of profit and the growth rate of the US economy. Judging from the distribution of 
eigenvalues of our bivariate VAR model, we observe in Figure A1 that both lie inside 
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The distribution of eigenvalues shown in Figure A1 indicates that our VAR model is 
well specified. The variables profit rate, r, and growth rate, g, are I(1) and I(0), 
respectively; thus, the appropriate testing method for the presence of possible causal 
relationship between them is the Toda-Yamamoto (TY) causality test. The results of 
the analysis are reported in Table A1.  
 
 
Table A.1: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests, with two lags, USA, 1948-2017 
 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests, 1950-2021 
Dependent variable: g  
Excluded Chi-square Df Probability 
r  8.19 2  0.0166 
All  8.19 2  0.0166 
Dependent variable: r  
Excluded Chi-square Df Probability 
g  31.72 2  0.000 
All 31.72 2  0.000 
 
The results reported in Table A.1 suggest that the null hypothesis that the growth rate 
does not Granger Cause the rate of profit is certainly rejected; and the same is also true 
for the rate of profit although with not the same certainty. Thus, we conclude the 
bidirectional causality between the two variables.  
 
The simple TY Granger causality results encourage the use of an ARDL model in which 
we include only the two variables, g and r, precisely because we want to test in a pure 
and straightforward way the strength of the dependence of the growth rate on the rate 
of profit. For the application of the ARDL model, we need to ensure that at least one of 
the two variables is I(1). As we pointed out the rate of profit after many tests is shown 
to be an I(1) variable, after all we are testing the law of the tendentially falling rate of 
profit. However, we cannot say the same with the growth rate of real GDP, since real 
GDP is an I(1) variable and its growth rate is expected to be stationary; in fact this is 
what most tests have shown, a result rather expected by the SS hypothesis. The 
econometric analysis suggested the ARDL model with one lag in both the growth rate 
and the rate of profit as the best ARDL model whose results along with those of the 













Table A.2: ARDL (1,1) Long Run Form and Bounds Test 
Case 1: Conditional Error Correction Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
c -0.046460 0.022425 -2.071812 0.0423 𝑔(−1)* -0.598230 0.114690 -5.216054 0.0000 𝑟(−1) 0.829997 0.307378 2.700248 0.0088 𝛥(𝑟) 4.752168 0.594769 7.989938 0.0000 
  * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
Case 1: Levels Equation: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
r 1.387421 0.443692 3.126990 0.0026 
c -0.077663 0.034668 -2.240205 0.0285 
EC =𝑔 - (0.8231*𝑟  -0.0202 )   
F-BoundsTest Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
TestStatistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  9.078247 10%   3.02 3.51 
k 1 5%   3.62 4.16 
  2.5%   4.18 4.79 
  1%   4.94 5.58 
 
The bound test results indicate cointegration of the two variables at the 1% level of 
significance and furthermore the two variables are directly related. The results with the 
error correction are presented in Table A.3 where we observe that the error correction 
term is statistically significant and equal to −0.598 indicating that any deviations from 
the equilibrium are restored quite fast back to the long run relationship.  
 
Table A.3: ARDL Error Correction Model 
ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    𝛥𝑟 4.752168 0.573388 8.287882 0.0000 
CointEq(-1)* -0.598230 0.112908 -5.298371 0.0000 
R-squared 0.713999     Mean dependent var -0.001791 
Adjusted R-squared 0.709730     S.D. dependent var 0.028991 
S.E. of regression 0.015619     Akaike info criterion -5.452076 
Sum squared resid 0.016345     Schwarz criterion -5.387319 
Log likelihood 190.0966     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.426385 




The ARDL results displayed in Tables A.2 and A.3 further suggest that the short-run 
effects of the rate of profit are stronger than the long run effects as this is derived by 
the short-run coefficient Δ𝑟 = 4.75 > 𝑟 = 0.829.  Finally, the ARDL results are 
robust as this can be judged by the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, displayed on the 
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Figure A.2: CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests 
 
 
In Figure A.2, we observe that the plot of the CUSUM test is within the criteria 
boundaries and the same is true for the CUSUMQ approaches, both found within the 
5% bounds indicating that our model is stable. Hence, once again the classical political 
economy hypothesis and argument for the centrality of the rate of profit in determining 
the economy's growth rate also finds strong statistical support.  
 
